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I . 
JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) and 
78-2a-3 (2)(j), (1953, as amended). 
II. 
OBJECTION TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH 
PERTINENT FACTS 
Appellees set forth what they believe to be a statement of the case with 
pertinent facts which although generally relate to matters not on appeal are none 
the less set forth without citation to the record as required under Rule 24, Utah 
Page 1 of 12 
Rules of Appellant Procedure. Rule 24 requires that all statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citation to the record in 
accordance with Paragraph (e) of this Rule. There are more than seventy (70) 
sentences comprising the statement of the case and pertinent facts of Appellees 
brief and many of the sentences contain multiple statements of fact yet only 
twenty-one (21) of those statements refer to a citation of any kind, whether to the 
record, trial transcript, or Appellant's Addendum and at least one is so broad as to 
literally refer to the entire trial transcript of the record on appeal. See the first full 
paragraph of page seven (7) of Appellees' Brief. Many of the citations are unclear 
as to whether they are referenced to the trial record or to the trial transcript which 
is significant in this case since the trial transcript is nearly twenty-two hundred 
(2,200) pages and the trial record exceeds thirteen hundred (1,300) pages. By and 
large, the statements made by Appellees which carry no citation mischaracterize 
the facts. 
Appellant believes that it would be inappropriate to give weight to the 
statements of fact made in Appellees' brief where no citation has been made to the 
record. However, more importantly, Appellant asserts that Appellees have failed to 
make any reference to the trial record, transcript, or exhibits which would indicate 
a factual finding that the Appellant, individually, should be liable for attorney fees 
except to refer generally to the Notice of Mechanic's Lien and Lis Pendens. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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III. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1: 
APPELLEES MISCHARACTERIZE THE ISSUES AT TRIAL REGARDING 
FORECLOSURE OF A MECHANICS LIEN. 
While Appellees are correct in asserting that a Mechanic's Lien was recorded 
and legal action commenced asserting breach of contract as one cause of action 
and foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien as a second cause of action, the foreclosure of 
the Mechanic's Lien was no longer an issue at trial. No jury instruction addressed 
the issue of foreclosure. The jury verdict attached as Appellants' Addendum IB, 
addresses all of the issues at trial and does not even mention the word foreclosure. 
The only reference to ulien" in the jury verdict is to the wrongful lien claim asserted 
by Appellees, to which this Appellant and Co-Defendant LONETREE SERVICES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, doing business as LONETREE LOG HOMES, both prevailed. 
There was no issue of foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien since the Court on or about the 
22nd day of July, 1996 ordered the release of Lien and Lis Pendens, the same by its 
own language referred to the lien as being expunged or in the alternative released. 
See Appellant's Addendum 3a. From that point forward, Appellant lost whatever 
right it may have had to foreclose, by order of the Court effectively dismissing 
count two of the Complaint filed by this Appellant and Co-Defendant, LONETREE. 
Appellees are inaccurate in attempting to characterize the foreclosure of 
Mechanic's Lien as a part of the breach of contract action. The foreclosure of 
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Mechanic's Lien is a statutory remedy and the breach of contract action is a 
separate remedy dictated by the terms of the agreement between the parties. 
Since the terms of the agreement between the parties did not include an award of 
attorney fees, the surviving claim for breach of contract did not include the 
recovery of attorney fees. If Appellant had prevailed on the breach of contract 
action at trial, given the fact that the statutory remedy had been lost by release or 
expungement of lien, Appellees would have been justified in arguing that attorney 
fees were not recoverable. Consequently, Appellant argues that the reverse is true 
and attorney fees are not recoverable as against this Appellant 
POINT NO. 2: 
APPELLANT DID NOT FORCE APPELLEE TO RELEASE OR EXPUNGE THE MECHANIC'S 
LIEN AND LIS PENDENS AND POST BOND WITH THE COURT. 
In Appellees' brief under the caption "The District Court properly awarded 
attorney fees and costs to KURTHS for their defense of Mechanic's Lien, filed and 
prosecuted by WIARDA" Appellees address the issue of release and expungement of 
the Mechanic's Lien and Lis Pendens by posting bond with the Court. Appellees 
admit that the Mechanic's Lien and Lis Pendens was released or expunged on or 
about the 23rd day of July, 1996. Appellees attempt to assert that in some way 
Appellant forced them to file a Motion to Expunge or Release Lien. This Appellant 
asserts that he did not force Appellees to file their motion. The Lien was not 
wrongfully filed as factually determined by the jury. Likewise, Appellant did not 
force the Court to rule in favor of Appellees or cause the Lien to be released. 
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Appellant argues that if attorney fees were to be addressed, they should have been 
addressed at the time the Lien was released or an express reservation made in the 
Order to allow for such consideration at a later date. Appellant believes that the 
claim for attorney fees was thereafter waived. 
Notwithstanding, even if the trial court were to reconsider attorney fees at 
the time the Lien was released, those amounts would be substantially less and have 
been calculated for the convenience of this Court and are set forth in Appellant's 
Brief. Appellant believes that this particular issue is meritorious and should have 
been more clearly addressed both with regard to issues of fact and law and are not 
as Appellees contend "patently meritless." 
POINT NO. 3: 
APPELLEES APPLY THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW REGARDING ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS. 
Rule 24 requires that a statement of the issue as well as the Standard of 
Appellant Review with supporting authority be set forth as a briefing requirement, 
but pursuant to subsection (b), a statement of the issues or of the case is not 
necessary. Appellees' Brief has no separate section regarding the standard of 
review on appeal of the trial court's award of attorney fees but refers in the body of 
its argument to the "patent error and clear abuse of discretion" standard applied in 
the Utah Supreme Court case of Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
It should be noted that the Fitzgerald case addresses attorney fees under the 
statutory provision of Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). This 
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statutory provision refers to the award of attorney fees in the context of a 
nonmeritorious claim brought in bad faith. A close reading of the Fitzgerald case 
suggests that the Standard of Review is mixed by reason of the findings regarding 
the element of bad faith, a discretionary matter with the trial court. However, 
when viewed in its entirety, Appellant believes that the standard in fact is consistent 
with the "correctness" Standard of Review cited in Appellant's Brief. In Fitzgerald, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. See 
also Robertson v. Gem INS. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). Likewise whether the trial courts' finding 
of fact in support of an award of fees is sufficient is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App.) (Citing State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991)), cert, denied 
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). However, the trial court has 
"broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination 
against an abuse-of-discretion standard" Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). Id. 316. 
Notwithstanding, the Appellant asserts that whatever Standard of Review is 
applied by the Court of Appeals in this case, the trial court's reasoning and rationale 
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will not survive the Court's scrutiny with regard to the trial court's final order 
awarding attorney fees as against this Appellant individually. 
The trial court's Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
June 17, 1998, is not supported by the evidence at trial, the jury verdict or the trial 
court's previous Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. Appellees have failed to 
cite any place in the record or transcript that would support such a conclusion. 
Appellant asserts that no such evidence exists within the trial record or the 
transcript. The Memorandum Decision of the trial court presents the basis upon 
which the court relied in making its decision and calculation of attorney fees yet 
does not address the basis for finding Appellant individually liable and when 
considering the Memorandum Decision with Appellant's individual liability in mind, 
the reasoning of the trial court seems misplaced, miscalculated and illogical. 
While Appellees did not counter-appeal the issue of attorney fees, they 
acknowledge that the trial court's calculation of reasonable fees is flawed, the 
Appellees believing that Appellant was given credit twice by the form of the trial 
court's calculation. In short, even Appellees take issue with this random form of 
calculation and cite to authority that supports the proposition that a reduction of 
reasonable attorney fees by the Court would be viewed on appeal as an abuse of 
discretion. Appellant asserts that this shows that the trial court's award of attorney 
fees as against this Appellant is in error and demonstrates a clear abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
/ / / 
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Appellant believes it is important to point out that all of the court's rulings 
and orders prior to its Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of June 
17, 1998, make no specific reference to Appellant individually but seem to strongly 
infer that the Co-Defendant, LONETREE SERVICES, INC., was to be the party 
against whom the trial court originally contemplated an award of attorney fees. 
The Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed June 17, 1998, 
suggests that the change, finding Appellant individually liable for attorney fees, was 
but an after thought without careful consideration as to what had previously been 
ordered. 
POINT NO. 4: 
UTAH LAW PRESUMES THAT A JURY AWARD WOULD INCLUDE ATTORNEY FEES 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Appellees dismiss without citation or authority the argument that since the 
issue of attorney fees was not presented at trial as part of the measure of 
damages, it was fair to conclude that the jury assumed that its award of damages 
included attorney fees as part of the actual and compensatory damages sustained. 
Appellant has cited to the appropriate authority of this Court, Glezof v. Frontier 
Investments, 826 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995), and has set forth its reasons why it 
believes the presumption should be applied in this instance. Appellant asserts that 
the position has merit and is more than a red herring or frevious argument as made 
out to be by Appellees. 
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POINT NO. 5: 
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON WRONGFUL LIEN IS SIGNIFICANT 
AS A FACTUAL FINDING 
Without rehashing the arguments of Appellees' Brief, Appellant wishes to 
reply to the assertion by Appellees that the wrongful lien claim is wholly inapplicable 
to the Appellees right to attorney fees in defending the foreclosure of Mechanic's 
Lien. Appellees wish to contend that their claim for wrongful lien is entirely 
different and has nothing to do with their claim for fees in defense of the Mechanic's 
Lien. Appellant argues to the contrary. The two are very much related. It is 
illogical to assume otherwise. The filing of the Mechanic's Lien is either appropriate 
or wrongful. In the instant case it is significant since the jury had a specific 
instruction to find whether or not the Mechanic's Lien was wrongful. Appellant has 
set forth in its brief its reasoning why it believes that such determination is 
important from a factual standpoint. The fact that the law treats the two differently 
does not diminish its factual significance. 
Moreover, Appellant asserts that Appellees' citation to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 38-9-1 et, seq., (1953, as amended), is taken out of context and that when the 
same is considered in its entirety, the claim for wrongful lien is not applicable when 
the lien involves is a Mechanic's or Materialmen's Lien. Nonetheless, since the 
instant case involved a Lien, that of a Mechanic's Lien, the factual issue of whether 
or not the same was wrongful is significant in the determination of the issue of 
/ / / 
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whether or not attorney fees should be awarded to a successful party in defending 
the same. 
POINT NO. 6: 
COSTS FOR EXPERT WITNESSES WERE NOT PROPERLY AWARDED UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Appellant believes this issue has been dealt with extensively and without 
readdressing the arguments made in Appellant's Brief, simply assert that such costs 
on their face, the expert witness fees for the structural engineer and log grader 
testifying as to workmanship and quality of materials have absolutely nothing to do 
with defending an alleged claim of foreclosure of a Mechanic's Lien. The Appellant 
believes that there is no more glaring example of how these costs have been found 
recoverable through poor and inappropriate judicial reasoning under the 
circumstances of this case. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, and also for those 
reasons set forth in Appellants Brief, having replied to Appellees Brief prays that 
relief be granted in reversing the trial courts decision in awarding attorney fees and 
costs against this Appellant, DANIEL WIARDA, Individually, or that the same be 
remanded, ordering that judgment be entered consistent with the evidence at trial 
and the trial court's previous Findings and Conclusions, finding the Appellant, 
DANIEL WIARDA, not liable on all claims of Appellees and that the same be 
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dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, together with such additional and 
further relief as this Court of->Appeals deen^s appropriate. 
DATED this """/(/"day of 
JRYAN JACKSON 
Attorney fo^Defenaant/Appellant 
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